Game theory

Prisoner's Dilemma

Canonical 2x2 game where individually rational defection leads to a Pareto-inferior outcome.

Ask the Game theory assistant 1 min read · Updated September 9, 2026

Definition

A symmetric 2×22\times 2 game with payoffs satisfying T>R>P>ST>R>P>S and 2R>T+S2R>T+S, where CC and DD denote Cooperate and Defect.

A standard payoff matrix is ((R,R)(S,T)(T,S)(P,P))\begin{pmatrix}(R,R)&(S,T)\\(T,S)&(P,P)\end{pmatrix} with e.g. (T,R,P,S)=(5,3,1,0)(T,R,P,S)=(5,3,1,0).

Intuition

Each player strictly prefers to defect regardless of the opponent, yet mutual cooperation is strictly better than mutual defection.

It exposes the tension between individual incentives and collective welfare — rationality yields (P,P)(P,P) rather than (R,R)(R,R).

Worked example

With (T,R,P,S)=(5,3,1,0)(T,R,P,S)=(5,3,1,0), defecting yields 55 vs cooperating 33 if the other cooperates, and 11 vs 00 if the other defects, so DD strictly dominates CC.

Real-world analogs: arms races, cartel cheating, doping in sports, and climate-change free-riding.

The math

In the one-shot game DD is strictly dominant; the unique Nash equilibrium is (D,D)(D,D). In infinitely repeated play with discount factor δ≥(T−R)/(T−P)\delta\ge (T-R)/(T-P), cooperation can be sustained by trigger strategies (Folk Theorem).

Axelrod's tournaments showed that simple reciprocal strategies like Tit-for-Tat often prevail in iterated play.

Where it is used

Models public-goods provision, oligopoly collusion stability, and international treaty enforcement.

It motivates mechanism design, reputation, and long-run relationships.

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